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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a30) (1953 as amended).1
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case is an appeal from a final order from the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, entered by the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, on March 7, 2000.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the Court err in failing to grant Plaintiffs Motion for Relief From Order

under Rule 60(b)(1).
A review of the trial court's denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) is made under an
abusive of discretion standard. Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52(Utah 1984).
2.

Did the Trial Court err in its finding that adequate notice of the hearing had

been given to the Plaintiffs.
Determination of whether notice was adequate is a mixed question of law and fact
which the Court should review for correctness. Gramlich v. Munsey. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132
(Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION STATUTE AND RULES
The determinative constitutional provisions and rule in this case are reproduced herein
as Addendum "B".

hereafter all references to the Utah Code Annotated shall be to the 1953 code as amended
unless otherwise noted.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action began as a simple eviction brought pro se by the Plaintiff against the
Defendant on September 14, 1999 in the Third Judicial Court. R.l. On September 16, 1999 a
cost bond was tendered and a motion to set amount of cost bond was filed with the court. R.3.
On or about September 21, 1999 the Defendant filed an answer. R.7. The parties thereafter
agreed to go to mediation to resolve their dispute. R.16. The result of the mediation was an
agreement by the parties which agreement was approved by the court. R.18. The Defendant
failed to keep her obligations under the terms of the mediation.
On or about October 15, 1999 by virtue of an order of the Honorable Steven L.
Henriod in Case No. 990905653 a receiver was put in control of the property in place of the
Plaintiffs.
The address for the Plaintiffs as listed on the complaint was 3719 South 3375 West,
No. D, West Valley City, Utah. R.l. This was the address of the on site managers obtained
by the Plaintiffs. With the appointment of the receiver these individuals were no longer
considered the managers of the complex. On October 27, 1999 the court entered an order
setting a time for the Defendant to receive her personal property. R. 37.
On November 1, 1999 the Defendant filed a motion requesting a hearing claiming that
she had suffered damages as a result of certain items that turned up missing from her property.
R.38. On November 2, 1999 the court sent notice that the hearing on the Defendant's motion
was scheduled for November 16, 1999 R.42.
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The notice was sent to 3705 South 3375 West, West Valley City, Utah. This was not
the address of the Plaintiffs nor the address which they had listed at the time the complaint was
filed. R.42. That notice was returned to the court as being undeliverable. R.44.
In spite of the fact that Plaintiffs received no notice of the hearing, the hearing was held
as scheduled and judgment was granted to the Defendant in the amount of $3,450.00.
R.46Plaintiffs subsequently learned of the entry of the judgment and retained counsel in an
effort to have the judgment set aside. A motion to set aside the judgment was filed on January
25, 2000. R.57. The Plaintiffs' motion was denied March 7, 2000 and subsequently this
appeal was brought. R.68, R.71.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On September 14, 1999 a complaint for eviction was brought by the Plaintiffs pro se in

the Third Judicial District Court. R.l.
2.

On September 16, 1999 a cost bond was tendered and a motion to set the amount of cost

bond was filed with the court. R.3.
3.

The address on the complaint was 3719 South 3375 West #D, West Valley City, Utah.

R.l.
4.

On or about September 21, 1999 an answer was filed. R.7.

5.

Thereafter the parties agreed to mediation. R. 16.

6.

The parties entered a settlement which was reported by the mediator and approved by the

court. R.l8
7.

Defendant failed to comply with the terms of the mediation.
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8.

On October 28, 1999 the court entered an order setting a time for the Defendant to

retrieve her personal property. R.37
9.

On November 1, 1999 the Defendant filed a motion requesting a hearing in order to

determine damages she claimed as a result of missing or damaged items. R.38.
10.

On November 2, 1999 the court sent notice for a hearing on the Defendant's request for

November 16, 1999. R.42.
11.

The notice was sent to 3705 South 3375 West, West Valley City, Utah. R.42.

12.

The notice was returned to the court as undeliverable. R.44.

13.

The hearing proceeded as scheduled with Plaintiffs not being present and judgment was

granted to the defendant in the amount of $3,450.00. R.46.
14.

A motion to set aside the judgment was filed on January 25, 2000. That motion was

denied March 7, 2000. R.57, R.68.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The fundamental underpinnings of our legal system are the rights guaranteed in the
United States and Utah Constitution to due process. "Timely and adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural fairness." In re
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996). That very fundamental right has been denied the
Plaintiffs in this action. The court held a hearing resulting in a judgment and forfeiture in favor
of the Defendant where the Plaintiffs never received notice. In fact, the court was aware that
the Plaintiffs never received notice as the notice sent by the court was delivered to the wrong
address had been returned as undeliverable.
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When the Plaintiffs discovered the judgment entered against them they timely moved
under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures for relief from that order. The very
reason for the creation of the rule was to provide relief in situations like the one before this
court. Where any reasonable excuse is offered by a defaulting party, the court generally tends
to favor granting relief from a default judgment, unless it appears that to do so would result in
substantial injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W.
Larsen Contracting. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).
There was no showing or finding by the court that any injustice, let alone a substantial
injustice would have been incurred by requiringthe Defendant to have a full and fair hearing.
The sole basis for the court's ruling in this case appears to have been that the Plaintiffs
had not updated their address at the time they had been relieved of possession of the property
by Judge Henriod.
The modest amount of inconvenience that vacating the judgment would cause compared
with the harsh result that has been rendered constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Accordingly
the order of Judge Peuler should be overturned and providing the Defendant desires to
continue with her claim a full and fair hearing should be had thereon.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENIES THE PLAINTIFFS DUE PROCESS.
Utah's due process clause provides, "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 7. In the case of In re
Worthen. 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court addressed the concept of due
process. The court stated:
5

In Untermeyer v. State Tax Commission, we held that Utah's constitutional guarantee
of due process is substantially the same as the due process guarantees contained in the
5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution. Untermeyer at 102 Utah
214, 129 P.2d 881,885 (1942). We have delineated these requirements in a variety of
contexts, for "'due process is flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the
given situation demands."' Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902, 911
(Utah 1993) quoting In re Whitesel. I l l Wash. 2d 621, 763 P.2d 199, 203 (1988)). At
a minimum timely and adequate uotice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
way are at the very heart of procedural fairness" Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207,
1211 (Utah 1993); accord Plum v. State. 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); See also
Provo River Water Users Association v. Morgan. 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah 1993). We
have also held that "every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing held
before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive a fair trial in front of
a fair tribunal." Bunnell v. Industrial Commission. 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987).
In re Worthen at 876.
The crux of this case is that the Plaintiffs were never given an opportunity to have a fair
hearing. They never received notice of the hearing that was held and were not present. The
Plaintiffs sought to remedy that situation by filing the motion under Rule 60 for relief from the
order of judgment. That motion was denied by the court solely on the basis that the court felt
that the notice as sent was adequate.
Where notice was ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the
proceedings against him . . . a party is deprived of due process." Nelson. 669 P.2d at
1212. Thus, to satisfy due process, a hearing "'must be prefaced by timely notice
which adequately informs the parties of the specific issues that they must prepare to
meet.'" id at 1213 (quoting State v. Gibbs. 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209, 215 (1972)).
Moreover, "'due process' is not a technical concept that can be reduced to a formula
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Rather, 'the demands
of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a
procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved.'" id. (Quoting Rupp
v. Granstville Citv. 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)
In re Worthen at 877.
The facts of this case are that the Plaintiffs filed an eviction action against the
Defendant. The complaint set forth an address for the Plaintiff. After an answer by the
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Defendant the matter went to mediation where a settlement was entered into by the parties and
read into and accepted by the court.
Defendant violated her obligations under the terms of the mediation. At that point the
Plaintiffs were under no form of notice that any additional proceedings would be held in the
court save any proceedings that they themselves had brought for deficiencies against the
Defendant
By virtue of a separate proceeding unrelated to the action before this court the Plaintiffs
were temporarily divested of control of their property. During that time of divestiture the court
entered an order allowing the Defendant to remove her property from her apartment and
further entered an order in this case awarding the Defendant judgment for damages allegedly
incurred through damaged or missing items in her apartment.
Setting aside the fact that the Plaintiffs were not in control of the property at the time of
the alleged problem, and the fact that by judicial order they had no authority or control over
the property, the basic fact is that notice was not sent to the proper address and the Plaintiffs
never received notice of the hearing. The address on the complaint was 3719 South 3375 West,
#D, West Valley City, Utah. The individuals residing at that address continued to reside there
even after the change in control of the property took place. They would have forwarded the
information to the Plaintiffs had they received it. The notice from the court was sent to 3705
South 3375 West, West Valley City, Utah. Where the notice was sent to an address that was
not the same as that on the complaint and where the court knew that notice had not been
received, as it was returned to the court, it was improper to hold the hearing. It was even more
improper to refuse to set aside the order once the problem was clearly discovered and brought
7

to the court's attention. Because the orders of the court in this matter violate the due process
rights of the plaintiffs the order should be reversed and the judgment in favor of the Defendant
vacated.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60 MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure exists to provide relief from judgments or

orders "in the furtherance of justice." There are six specific reasons enumerated in the current
version of the rule. The first five reasons must require the motion for relief to be brought
within three months after the judgment is entered while the 6th basis allows for the filing in a
reasonable time. The current Rule 60 motion could have been brought under either the first
basis for mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, or under the 6th basis under the
violation of the plaintiffs' rights to due process. See Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras. 11
Utah 2d 357, 359 P.2d 21 (1961). In any event the motion in this instance was brought within
the 90 day period of time and therefore would be timely. The Utah Supreme Court has found
that where any reasonable excuse is offered by a defaulting party, the courts generally tend to
favor granting relief from a default judgment, unless it appears to do so would result in a
substantial injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W.
Larson Contractor. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). The rule makes it clear and the courts have
long held that a default judgment can be set aside upon the grounds of excusable neglect.
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962).
The facts of this case show the Plaintiffs have a reasonable excuse for their failure to
receive notice and to fail to appear at the hearing. The first reasonable excuse is that the notice
was not sent to the address the Plaintiffs listed as their address on the summons and complaint.
8

The second basis is that the Plaintiffs were precluded from returning to the property by virtue
of another order order of the court. Impossibility of compliance with a court order, such as the
order that the Plaintiff return property . . . is an appropriate basis for amendment of the order.
Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985). Where the Plaintiffs' performance under the
demands of the court had become a legal impossibility at the time that the order was entered by
virtue of another order of the Third District Court it would be inappropriate for the trial court
in this action not to relieve the Plaintiff from the claim. Indeed the claim should properly have
been asserted against the receiver, M&M Management Company, which had possession and
allegedly had control of the Defendant's property at the time the problem was alleged to have
occurred.
CONCLUSION
Whether under standard analysis of Rule 60 or under the heightened scrutiny which
should be afforded to the rule at the time it has been used in a fashion to deny due process to a
party it is plain that the trial court's order denying the motion for relief under Rule 60 was an
abuse of discretion and this Court should reverse the same.
Respectfully Submitted.
DATED this 8th day of September, 2000.
LARSON, TURNER, FAIBANKS & DALBY LC

Shawn D. Turner
DUNCANAI' HKh
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of September, 2000, I mailed, postage
prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to the following:

Dorthy Duncan
1720 North Beck Street, #4
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

•/>•-
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ADDENDUM A
COPY OF ORDER APPEALED FROM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VALERY VOLOSTNYKH and

:

MINUTE ENTRY

NELLYA VOLOSTNYKH,
Plaintiffs,

CASE NO.

990909105

VS.

DOROTHY DUNCAN,
Defendant.

:

Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on
plaintiffs1

Motion to Set Aside Judgment.

The Court having

reviewed the pleadings filed, now enters the following ruling.
The plaintiffs1 Motion to Set Aside Judgment is denied.

The

plaintiffs1 basis for the Motion is that the Court failed to send
notice to the proper address.

In fact, it appears that the Court

mailed notice to the plaintiffs at the last address provided to the
Court by the plaintiffs before the time of the hearing. The Court
docket does provide an address change, but that address was
provided on January 19, long after the hearing held in this matter.
Since it is the plaintiffs' responsibility to keep the Court and
opposing parties advised of a current address, the Court determines
that notice was provided in accordance with the rules.

VOLOSTNYKH V. DUNCAN

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

This Minute Entry will constitute the Order of the Court and
no further Order is required to be prepared in the matter at this
time.
Dated this (

day of March, 2000.

SANDRA N. PEULER !"-: J,l ^&'M£i

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE \ **

^i2~

,-!

VOLOSTNYKH V, DUNCAN

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this
2000:

James H. Deans
Attorney for Plaintiffs
440 South 700 East, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dorothy Duncan
1729 N. Beck Street #4
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

*7 day of March,

ADDENDUM B
DETERMTNATTVE STATUTES AND RULES

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Copyright © 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through End of 2000 General Session
§ 7

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due proces:
of law.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6o
WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
Copr. © West Group 1999. All rights reserved.
Current with amendments received through 11-1-1999
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may
be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.
[Amended effective April 1,1998.]

